Abstract. -With the explosive growth of accessible information, expecially on the Internet, evaluation-based filtering has become a crucial task. Various systems have been devised aiming to sort through large volumes of information and select what is likely to be more relevant. In this letter we analyse a new ranking method, where the reputation of information providers is determined self-consistently.
Introduction. -The study of complex networks and of some dynamical processes taking place on these structures has recently attracted a great deal of attention in the physics community [1] [2] [3] [4] . The importance of technological networks, such as the Internet, lies mostly in the increased communication capabilities [5, 6] , which make information progressively easier to produce and distribute. As storage and transmission costs continue to drop, an overabundance of information threatens to overwhelm its recipients. It is, therefore, crucial to process information in order to present a user only the one that answers best her requests [7] .
An important aspect of information filtering regards scoring systems in the World Wide Web [8, 9] . They collect evaluations and aggregate them into published scores that are meaningful to the final user. This embraces many different instances, ranging from commercial websites, where buyers evaluate sellers (Ebay, Amazon, etc.) to new generation search engines (Google, Yahoo, etc.), and opinion websites, where people evaluate objects (Epinions, Tailrank, etc.) Since the evaluators carry different expertise, it is important to estimate how accurate a given vote may be and to weight it accordingly. This can be done through the use of raters' reputations [10] . Reputation summarises one's past behaviour and has always been used to bear the risk of interacting with strangers. The Internet, while enhancing such a risk, brings in the possibility to find its antidotes [11] . Since nobody knows a-priori who are the honest and competent evaluators, in fact, online scoring systems often include some measure of their past performance. This gives users an indication on how trustworthy a given piece of information is supposed to be. An expert of the field would probably obtain a high reputation; experts' votes should then count more when aggregating the scores. While reputation is usually obtained by asking users supplementary evaluations about other users, the procedure of Iterative Refinement (IR), which can be shown to outperform naive methods [12] , does not require to explicitly rate the raters.
The aim of this letter is to study, in a generalised model, the IR method's dependence on the relevant parameters, illustrate the subtle issues in its mathematical underpinning and elaborate on distortions generated by different kinds of cheating. Prior to describing the major focus of this work, we will briefly state the model and define some notations.
Model and algorithm. -To describe our approach in the simplest manner, let us consider N raters evaluating M objects, which can be books, movies or even other raters. Each object l has an intrinsic quality Q l and each rater i has an intrinsic judging power 1/σ 2 i . Let x il be a random variable representing the rating given by rater i to object l. Intrinsic qualities and judging powers are defined by the first two moments of its distribution:
where ∆ il is the systematic error of agent i towards object l. Expectation values are taken over the distribution of x il . They can be regarded as ensemble averages, obtained if the evaluations were to be performed infinitely many times. Our aim is then to extract the quality of each object from a single set {x il } of evaluations. We thus estimate the intrinsic quality Q l of object l by a weighted average of the received votes
the inverse judging power σ 2 i of rater i is estimated by the sample variance V i
The unnormalised weights ω i take the general form
with β ≥ 0 and f i = ω i / j ω j . As such, ω i decreases when V i increases because rater i has a lower judging power and should be given less credit. We will consider scenarios where β equals 1 or 1/2. The case β = 1/2, in fact, exhibits scale-changing and translational invariance because q l becomes a sum of dimensionless random variables; the case β = 1 corresponds to optimal weights, as explained later in the section No systematic errors. The IR algorithm allows to solve eqs. 
provided that x il has finite moments of, at least, order 4, in the large M limit one obtains
Here the overlined quantities represent averages over the M items, In the following we shall use the notation g i = e ii . Eq. (6) has to be interpreted in probability, as prescribed by the Central Limit Theorem. In its derivation we have further assumed that raters are independent; in fact, the correlation among the variables e ij of different indices diminishes as M increases. If M ≫ 1, the random variables {e ij } are effectively independent, with the first visible triangular correlation of order 1/M 2 or smaller. From counting the degrees of freedom associated with random numbers, it is desirable to have M ≥ (N + 1)/2. Eq. (6) forms the basis of our analytical pursuit in the later development.
The performance of the IR method can be stated by measuring the following mean squared errors:
with Bias(
In eq. (7) we have separated the systematic error part, making use of the variables∆ l = i f i ∆ il and s l = j (y jl − Q l )f j , with y il = x il − ∆ il . Eqs. (1, 2) guarantee that the first two moments of (y il − Q l ) are independent of index l, therefore s
l . This permits us to employ eq. (6) to obtain
The variable s l becomes Gaussian in the large N limit, as long as the weights f j are fixed and satisfy the Lindeberg condition [13] . However, such inference can't be drawn easily because the weights and the estimated q l are tangled up in eqs. (3) (4) (5) . The standard deviation of s l can, nevertheless, be calculated. The general problem of finding intrinsic values from completely distorted votes is not solvable. In fact, even if one disposed of an infinite number of raters and evaluations, the estimator (3) of Q l would always be biased of the amount ∆ l . We shall, in the following, focus our attention on three particular cases of special interest.
No systematic errors. -When ∆ il = 0 ∀i, l, raters are impartial but posses different judging powers. In order to obtain the best quality estimator one can minimise the mean squared error d q ({ω k }) of (3) with respect to the ω i 's. This gives the optimal weights [14] ,
Since the law of large numbers guarantees the convergence of d q ({1/σ k }) to zero for large N , the same must obviously be true for optimal weights. Unfortunately, it is not possible to state that the choice β = 1 is optimal if the σ 2 i 's are not known in advance. Although the convergence of q l → Q l for N → ∞ is guaranteed, the small deviation |q l − Q l | due to finite N will propagate to the estimate of σ 2 i and render V i = σ 2 i , even when M → ∞. A recursive procedure allows to calculate the expectation values for f i ; using eq. (6), it is straightforward to show that
Now we use ω i = V
−β i
and, after iterative substitutions, we may express ω i in terms of σ i 's and random variables {e ij }. One may then compute f i and plug it in eqs. Equipped with this formalism, we perform tedious but straightforward calculations to obtain the following asymptotic expansions, for M, N → ∞, to the first two dominating orders:
with complicated constant coefficients ( 1 ). These expressions simplify considerably when taking the limit β = 1/2 and β = 1. For instance, eq. (12) fig. 2 . We have also plotted therein, as a dotted line, the behaviour of the same quantity when the estimator of q l is just the average unweighted vote received by item l. This illustrates how IR is able to reduce the error. A comparison between the two weighting schemes shows that ω i = 1/V i performs almost always better than fig. 2 shows d σ vs. N ; the plateau, which is the same for β = 1/2 and 1, vanishes for M → ∞ when corrected for the bias as before.
Camouflage. -Let us now restart from the general problem of eqs. (1,2) . The case we want to analyse here is that of ratings affected by systematic errors that depend on the rater but not on the ratee, ∆ il = ∆ i ∀l. Such a fictitious distortion is instructive to study analytically and can be easily generalised to more interesting cases. In fact, as it alters a rater's scale of evaluation but not the ranking of her preferences, it can serve as a basis to study systems where agents are only asked to sort a set of items in order of increasing quality.
If one knew the values of ∆ i for all i, one could find the optimal weights {ω * k } proceeding as described in absence of systematic errors. Upon minimisation of d q ({ω k }) with respect to the ω i 's one obtains ω
Here we have used a more compact matrix notation, where 1 is a vector of ones.
Whenever the deviations ∆ i are small, limited to a minority of the population or randomly distributed around zero, they can be somehow detected. In the general case one can only detect, at best, the relative systematic errors. In fact∆ = j f j ∆ j does not depend on l in presence of camouflage and the relevant quantities only depend on ∆ i under the form δ i = ∆ i −∆. For instance, the variance can be written as
. This means that, if we change the ∆ i 's while keeping the δ i 's unchanged, we end up with the same result for d q , only translated by the amount∆.
In order to estimate analytically the performance of the IR method, we can posit∆ = 0 and solve eqs. (3) (4) (5) as before. Thus we find f i ({δ i }), whose term of order zero is (σ
This way we have a formal solution as a function of δ i , which must comply with the constraint i f i δ i = 0 and can eventually be recovered numerically.
Cheating. -It is interesting to consider the case of one intentional cheater I wanting to boost the value of object L of an amount ∆, all other raters being honest: ∆ il = δ iI δ lL ∆. Agent I commits no systematic error in evaluating all objects but L. Still, she would loose credibility and weight as ∆ becomes larger; this would eventually diminish her relative influence over object L. It is important to evaluate the difference δq l = q l (∆) − q l between the estimated value of the object with and without the friendly uprating. In fact a small δq, compared to the lost in credibility of the rater, discourages cheating, and vice-versa.
The variance, as defined in eq. (4), can be written as a function of ∆ and of the normalised weights. Hence
, where the formal expression of V i (0, {f i (∆)}) is equal to that of eq. (10). Iterative asymptotic expansions can be performed the same way we did in absence of systematic errors. In this case the variables y il are equal to the x il , except for
. If the value of ∆ is comparable to √ M , on the other hand, the zeroth order of the correction at the thermodynamic limit amounts to
In fig. 3 eq. (14) is shown to fit the simulations fairly well in the rank space. We have compared thereby the scheme β = 1 (circles) with β = 1/2 (stars) in the worst case: the best agent is trying to raise the worst object. In the region of moderate cheating the ω i = 1/ √ V i weighting scheme is less sensitive to cheating. This is particularly important left to the x = y line, where the cheater pays less then what she offers to the object and cheating can be advantageous. However, the relative influence of the cheater is a growing, although saturating, function of ∆. Under the ω i = 1/V i weighting scheme, on the other hand, such an influence starts decreasing once passed a crossover value. There the cheater's reputation is so much damaged by her misbehaviour that, if she attributed a higher value to object L, its estimated rank would diminish. Optimal weights are, therefore, much more resilient to severe cheating.
We just remark that, taking averages without refinement, a cheater would indefinitely increase an object's rank without undergoing any punishment. The transition to the cheater's unfavorable region is the solution of d r(q) = d r (σ) in the ∆ space.
Conclusion. -In this letter we have analyzed a novel scoring system that aggregates the evaluations of N agents over M objects by use of reputation and weighted averages. Agents, as a result, are ranked according to their judging capability and objects according to their quality. The method can be implemented via an iterative algorithm, where the intrinsic bias of the estimators of the weights can be corrected. We show, with simulations and analytical results, that the method is effective and robust against abuses. The larger the system, the better is the filtering precision. This method can be applied in web-related reputation and scoring systems.
